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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARIO KING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030544-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a restitution order imposed for his convictions for 
unlawful use of a credit card, and forgery, third degree felonies. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the sentencing court commit plain error when it ordered defendant, as a 
condition of parole, to pay $2,300 restitution jointly with his co-defendant for 
property fraudulently purchased with a fake credit card? 
Because defendant failed to preserve his claims below, this court reviews the lower 
court's ruling for plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-1209 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are attached in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302 (2002) 
Utah R. App. P. 24 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with fraudulent use of a credit card, forgery, and theft-all 
third degree felonies. R. 1-2. Defendant pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of a credit card 
and forgery. R. 48-49, 50-56. The theft charge was dismissed. Id. Defendant was 
subsequently sentenced to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay 
$2,300 restitution "jointly and severally with any co-defendant that may be convicted." 
R. 62, 67-68, 73:23. Defendant timely appealed. R. 69-70. 
Defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
asking this Court to remand the case to determine whether his counsel was ineffective for 
advising him to plead guilty. R. 69-70; see State v. King, 2004 UT App 79 
(Memorandum Decision). This Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction "insofar as it raises issues challenging the validity of [his] guilty 
plea." Id. The restitution challenge was not dismissed and defendant now pursues this 
claim on appeal. Id. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
"Someone shared with me that they could get fake credit cards."2 
Defendant needed money and the answer seemed simple: Get some fake credit 
cards. R. 61. 
On or about September 15, 2002, defendant entered the Sears department store in 
Cedar City, Utah. Id, His friend, Ryan Brown, waited outside. Id, Defendant purchased 
a camcorder, a digital camera, and four $500 gift certificates. Id, Defendant asked the 
salesperson to allocate the purchases between three different credit cards. Id, Suspecting 
a fraudulent purchase, the Sears manager called the bank to verify the cards' authenticity 
and was told that the numbers were good. Id. Still unsure of the sale, however, the 
manager called the bank that issued the credit cards and was told that the credit card 
owner was not aware of the purchases. Id. By that time, defendant had fled. Id. 
Defendant used a counterfeit card to purchase more than $3>700 worth of property 
Highway troopers later apprehended defendant and Ryan Brown in Green River, 
Utah. Id. The trooper found the two men attempting to mail two boxes full of cameras. 
Id, A search of defendant's vehicle yielded another digital camera, two video cameras, a 
new Toshiba laptop computer, and binoculars still in the packaging. Id, The troopers 
1
 The facts are taken from the sentencing hearing transcript and are stated in a light 
most favorable to the sentencing court's ruling. See, e.g., State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT 
Appl07,f l ,n.l ,69P.3d293. 
2
 See R. 61 (defendant's statement). 
3 
also discovered a wallet containing nineteen fraudulent credit cards of different types and 
styles. R. 4, 61. The unlawfully acquired property was valued at more than $35700.3 R. 
61. The officers subsequently confiscated the property and took the two men into 
custody. Id. 
"I know that I may be ordered... to make restitution/9 
Defendant's plea affidavit stated "I know that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime, including any restitution that may 
be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement." R. 53. Defendant 
initialed the statement. Id. The Pre-Sentence Investigation report recommended that 
defendant "[p]ay restitution in the amount of $2,300, jointly and severally with any co-
defendants that may be convicted." R. 61. The report also noted that the stolen items 
were confiscated and, at the time of the report, the manager of the Sears store had not 
received any of the property. Id. The court below sentenced defendant to zero to five 
years in prison and ordered him to jointly pay restitution in the amount of $2,300 as a 
condition of parole. R. 62, 67-68, 73:23. Defendant never objected to the restitution 
order-until now. R. 73. 
3
 The Sears store did not take a loss on the four $500 gift cards because they were 
canceled. R. 61. 
4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject defendant's claim, first, because he failed to adequately 
brief his argument and, second, because by failing to object to the restitution order below 
defendant rendered a plain error determination on appeal impossible. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANTS CLAIM BECAUSE HIS 
ARGUMENT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT 
CANNOT SHOW THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ANY ERROR, PLAIN OR 
OTHERWISE, BY ORDERING HIM TO PAY RESTITUTION 
Defendant argues "[i]t was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order 
restitution in the amount of the value of the merchandise, since it was not clearly lost or 
destroyed." Aplt. Br. at 4. More specifically, defendant claims "it is clear that an error 
occurred in setting the restitution at $2,300" because "the status of the merchandise was 
clearly set forth in the PSI" and "should have been obvious to the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 
4. Defendant's claims fail. 
A. Defendant's Claim That The Trial Court Erred In Ordering 
Restitution Should Be Rejected Because It Is Inadequately Briefed 
Because defendant has inadequately briefed his contention, this Court should 
decline to address it. Compliance with Utah appellate briefing rules is mandatory. 
Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comrn'n of Utah, 2004 UT 18,112, 89 P.3d 
131. Consequently, "a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed." Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 370, f 14, n.4, 80 P.3d 546 
5 
(quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)). A brief is inadequate when "it 
merely contains bald citations to authority without development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr. 
Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^  46, 70 P.3d 904 (quotation marks and citations omitted). At 
minimum, an adequate brief includes the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on." See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In Beehive Telephone v. Public Service Comm 'n, 2004 UT 18, ^ f 1, the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the necessity of adequate briefing under rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The Court found rule 24's "simple formatting requirements" were 
"not discretionary," but "mandatory" and briefs that "fail[] to conform to these 
requirements . . . may be disregarded or stricken . . . by the court." Id. at f 12. 
Specifically, the Court found the appellant failed to meet rule 24 formatting requirements 
by omitting required sections of the brief, such as preservation. Id. at f^ 13. The Court 
further found many of Beehive Telephone's arguments did not meet the substantive rule 
requirements. Id. at ^ 14. For instance, the argument section did not "consistently 
'contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . 
. . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.'" Id. 
(quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(3)). Consequently, the Court declined to address any of 
appellant's inadequately briefed claims. Id. at Tf 16. 
6 
Similarly, defendant here has failed to adequately brief his sole claim. Not only 
has he failed to meet formatting requirements under rule 24 by omitting the Statement of 
Facts, but he has also deficiently treated substantive rule 24 requirements. Defendant 
cites only Utah Code Ami. § "77-33a-302(4)(b)(i)," which does not exist,4 and State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-1209, to support his three-paragraph argument. Defendant then 
expects this Court to accept his bald assertions that plain error occurred, absent any 
supporting analysis or authority. See Aplt. Br. at 4. 
This Court should decline to address defendant's inadequately briefed argument. 
See State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) ("When an appellee fails to 
comply with [rule 24], we will decline to address the issue because the 'reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'" (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted)); 
accord Beehive Telephone Co., 2004 UT 18, ^ f 38 (declining to address all issues 
inadequately briefed); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 ("It is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed."); Burns v. 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996) ("This court has routinely declined to 
4
 The State assumes defendant intended to cite section 77-38a-302(5)(b)(l) (Utah 
restitution statute outlining factors the court shall consider when determining the 
restitution amount). 
7 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal.'" (quoting State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992))). 
B. Defendant's Failure To Object To The Restitution Order Renders It 
Impossible For Him To Demonstrate Plain Error; Further, the Status 
of Lost Or Stolen Property Does Not Determine Whether A Trial Court 
Should Order Restitution. 
Defendant concedes that he did not preserve his restitution claim because he did 
not object below. Aplt. Br. at 4. Because defendant did not raise this issue, he can only 
obtain review under the plain error doctrine. To demonstrate plain error, defendant must 
show "(i) [a]n error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-1209. Defendant can 
show none of these factors. 
1. Defendant cannot show any error, let alone obvious error, because the 
record is inadequate. 
The first two prongs of the Dunn test require defendant to show "[a]n error exists" 
and that the error was "obvious" to the trial court. Id. Defendant can show no error, let 
alone obvious error because the record is insufficient. 
Defendant asserts the "status of the merchandise was clearly set forth in the PSI" 
and therefore the error should have been "obvious to the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 4. 
However, though the PSI report states that the property was confiscated by the police, 
R.61 at 3, it also states that "at the time the Investigator contacted the manager of the 
8 
Sears store, he had not received any of the property." Id. Nothing in the record reflects 
whether the property was still confiscated at the time of trial or if Sears ever received the 
stolen property after trial. Moreover, the PSI does not make it at all "clear" or "obvious" 
that Sears would receive all of its property back in saleable condition. 
Defendant has the burden to provide the court with a complete record on appeal. 
See Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); Horton v. Gem State Mut.919A P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 
1990) (finding absent an adequate record, this Court must presume that the disposition of 
the trial court was correct). Defendant has not done so here. In the absence of a record 
analyzing the restitution order below, defendant can show no error. See State v. 
Blanchard, 1999 UT App 140, *1 (Memorandum Decision) (holding no plain error could 
occur because "defendant's objection was necessary to trigger lower court's obligation to 
hold restitution hearing"). 
Further, defendant's failure to object under the circumstances of this case also 
supports the conclusion that any error would not have been obvious to the trial court. 
Defendant received a copy of the PSI sometime before sentencing. The report 
recommended defendant pay restitution in the amount of $2,300 jointly with his co-
defendant. R. 61. Defendant's plea statement, which he signed in open court, see R.53, 
informed him that he could be required to pay restitution. Despite this advance notice, 
defendant did not object to either the PSFs recommendation or the imposition of the 
9 
restitution. If the claimed error was not obvious to defense counsel so as to prompt a 
timely objection, it would not have been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Hall 
946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App. 1997) (finding "if an error was not obvious to the trial 
court, it most likely was not obvious to trial counsel" (citations omitted)); State v. Segura, 
2000 UT App 260 (Memorandum Decision) ("If the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, it also should have been obvious to defense counsel"). 
Finally, as a practical matter, it will almost never be obvious error for a trial court 
to impose restitution absent a timely, specific objection. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
mandates restitution under specified circumstances. See Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 420-422 
(Utah 1987). Thus, when AP&P recommends restitution in a specific amount, the trial 
court has no way of knowing if that amount is incorrect unless the defendant objects. As 
noted, although the PSI here talks about the property being confiscated, it does not state 
what has happened to that property, whether it will ever be returned to the merchant, or if 
so, whether the merchant will be able to sell the merchandise at the same price it could 
have at the time of the theft. Thus, the PSI could not have made it obvious to the trial 
court that the merchant suffered no monetary harm or that the amount was incorrect. The 
trial court would only have been alerted to a mistake if defendant had disputed the 
amount. Because defendant did not object, the trial court could reasonably assume that 
the recommended restitution award was appropriate. Certainly, it would not have been 
"obvious" that the award was erroneous. 
10 
2. Defendant Cannot Show Harm Because Restitution Is Appropriate 
Even If The Fraudulently Obtained Merchandise Was Not Lost Or 
Destroyed. 
Defendant argues "[t]his error was harmful, in that it resulted in a restitution order 
based on the value of merchandise which was recovered rather than lost or destroyed." 
Aplt. Br .i( 4, 1 )efendant further asserts that under the restitution statute the sentencing 
court "shall, when determin[ing] the monetary sum for restitution, consider the value of 
the victim's property which was lost or destroyed." Id. Finally, he claims "the property 
in question in this case, as explained in the PSI, was not lost or destroyed, but was rather 
confiscated from [defendant] when he was arrested, and simply had not yet been returned 
to the victim by the police, who were holding it in evidence at the time of the sentencing 
hearing." Id. 
Property, however, need not be lost or destroyed for a trial court to order 
restitution. The Utah restitution statute provides that a court "shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter" when "a 
defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (emphasis added). Under the statute, pecuniary damages 
include: 
all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting 
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
11 
Utah Code Ann. §77-3 8a-102(6). This Court has held that restitution is proper when 
property has been converted, even when that property has been returned to the owner. 
See Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f 12. In an action for conversion, "the measure of 
damages . . . is the value of the property at the time of the conversion, plus interest." Id. 
at ^ 9 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Conversion damages also may include the 
"sum of money necessary to compensate the [victim] for all actual losses or injuries 
sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong." Id. (quoting 
Jenkins, 869 P.2d at 1004). 
Defendant's argument that he should not have to compensate the victim because 
the stolen property was allegedly in police possession is similar to the defendant's 
argument in State v. Corbitt, id. There, defendant Corbitt stole a truck, pled guilty to the 
charge, and was subsequently ordered to pay restitution. The defendant objected to the 
restitution order in the court below. The court held a full restitution hearing and 
determined that the order was appropriate. The defendant subsequently appealed the 
order, contending that "because the [victim] received an insurance payment on their claim 
for the stolen truck, the [victim] had no 'pecuniary damages' as a result of [the 
defendant's] criminal activity." Id. at^[ 12. 
In upholding the restitution order, the court considered the following factors. First, 
Corbitt "admitted in his plea affidavit the elements necessary to prove a conversion 
claim." Id. Second, "notwithstanding any subsequent insurance payment on behalf of the 
12 
[victim], the fact remains that by Corbitt's admitted possession of the stolen truck, Corbitt 
inflicted on the [victim] 'special damages . . . including] the money equivalent of 
property taken . . . and [other] losses," which the victim "could recover against Corbitt in 
a civil action' for conversion." Id, (quoting Utah Code Ann. §77-3 8a-102(6)). This 
Court concluded that the victim, therefore, suffered pecuniary loss under the plain 
meaning of the Utah restitution statute. And third, by admitting his guilt on the charge of 
possessing a stolen vehicle, the defendant "firmly established his responsibility for the 
pecuniary damages resulting from his criminal conduct." Id. This court consequently 
upheld the restitution order. 
Here, as in Corbitt, defendant "converted" property, pled guilty and was ordered to 
pay restitution. R.l-2, 50-56, 62, 67-68, 73:23. Defendant similarly asserts the damages 
stemming from his theft fall outside of the restitution statute because law enforcement 
officers recovered the stolen property. Aplt. Br. at 4. Nevertheless, like Corbitt, 
defendant admitted to the elements of conversion. See R.50-56. Further, a plain reading 
of the restitution statute reveals defendant's theft caused Sears to suffer pecuniary 
damages as contemplated by the statute. Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery and 
unlawful use of a credit card and the theft charge was dismissed. R.50-56. Despite any 
recovery of property, the fact remains that defendant's "admitted illegal possession" of 
the stolen property inflicted "special damages" on the victim "including] the money 
equivalent of the property taken and other losses." Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, \ 12 
13 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6)). Moreover, defendant stated in his plea 
affidavit that he recognized his accountability to pay restitution for harms stemming from 
the theft charge. See R. 53 ("I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement."). In sum, the status of lost or stolen property does not determine whether 
restitution is appropriate. Therefore, defendant has not demonstrated harm and 
his claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's sentence 
and restitution order. 
14 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED August 27th 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
15 
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84078, Attorney for Appellant. 
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Addendum A 
UT ST § 77-38a-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38a. CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
PART 3. RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS 
77-38a-302 Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence 
it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as 
part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102 (13) and in 
determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) 
through (5) . 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to 
compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court 
having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a 
part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (5). 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this part, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which 
the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense 
that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant 
facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted 
in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim 
of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional 
services and devices relating to physical or mental health 
care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of 
the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy 
and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense 
if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable 
wages that are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or 
equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and 
were essential to the victim's current employment at the time 
of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if 
the offense resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors 
listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden 
that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the 
court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the 
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make 
restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer 
entering an order of restitution if the court determines that 
the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as 
a result of considering an order of restitution under this 
Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim. 
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(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, ,the transcript of 
the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use thp 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25-
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003.) 
